In a landmark judgment clarifying the procedural nuances of the newly enacted Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), the Supreme Court has ruled that a Magistrate cannot entertain a complaint against a public servant under Section 175(4) unless the complainant has strictly complied with the mandatory conditions laid down in Section 175(3).

The Court emphasized that the safeguards established to prevent the harassment of public officials are not mere formalities but essential legal requirements that must be satisfied before any judicial intervention is sought.

The Core Issue: Standalone Provision or Procedural Extension?

The bench, comprising Justices Dipankar Datta and Manmohan, was tasked with interpreting the relationship between sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 175 of the BNSS.

The primary question was whether Section 175(4)—which specifically deals with complaints against public servants for offences allegedly committed during the discharge of official duties—operates as an independent "standalone" provision. If it were standalone, a complainant might theoretically approach a Magistrate directly, potentially even through an oral complaint.

However, the Supreme Court rejected this isolated interpretation. The Court held that Section 175(4) is an extension of Section 175(3) and must be read harmoniously with it.

The BNSS, which replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), has streamlined the process for seeking a court-ordered investigation. The Supreme Court outlined a clear "statutory hierarchy" that every aggrieved person must follow:

Step 1: The Police Station (Section 173(1)): The first step is to approach the local police to register a First Information Report (FIR).
Step 2: The Superintendent of Police (Section 173(4)): If the police officer in charge refuses to register the FIR, the complainant must approach the Superintendent of Police (SP) with a written complaint.
Step 3: The Judicial Magistrate (Section 175(3)): Only if the recourse to the SP fails to yield a result can the person approach the Judicial Magistrate.

The Court made it crystal clear: "Resort to the remedy before the Superintendent of Police is a mandatory precondition to invoke the jurisdiction of the judicial magistrate."

One of the most significant aspects of this ruling is the reiteration of the "Affidavit Requirement." Drawing from the celebrated precedent of Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. (2015), the Court held that an application to a Magistrate under Section 175(3) must be supported by a sworn affidavit.

This affidavit serves a dual purpose:

It ensures that the complainant takes responsibility for the allegations made.
It prevents the filing of frivolous or motivated complaints against public servants who are simply performing their duties.

The Court noted that allowing a complaint against a public servant under Section 175(4) without such an affidavit would lead to "anomalous results." It would mean that while a complaint against a private citizen requires an affidavit, a complaint against a public servant (which carries higher stakes for governance) could be filed more easily. This, the Court said, would run contrary to legislative intent.

The Court observed that Section 175(4) was designed to provide a "special procedure" for public servants, not a "shortcut" for complainants.

If Section 175(4) were treated as a standalone silo, it would allow people to bypass the SP and jump straight to the Magistrate. The Court warned that such an interpretation would produce "unintended outcomes" and break the structure of the law.

“If sub-section (4) of Section 175 were to be read in isolation... it would be open to a complainant to directly approach the judicial magistrate... while skipping the remedy provided by sub-section (4) of Section 173 before the Superintendent of Police,” the bench observed.

The Court also addressed the nature of the "complaint" mentioned in Section 175(4). It clarified that in this specific context, a "complaint" does not include oral allegations.

Given the legal environment and the requirement for accountability, the term must be understood as a formal, written application supported by an affidavit. This ensures that the Magistrate has a clear, documented basis to decide whether a preliminary inquiry or a full investigation is warranted.

The Supreme Court summarized its findings into several vital points for the legal fraternity and the public:

Harmony of Provisions: Sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 175 are not isolated. Sub-section (4) is an extension that adds extra layers of protection for public servants.
Power to Investigate: While both sub-sections empower a Magistrate to order an investigation, sub-section (4) mandates a specific procedure—including giving the public servant an opportunity to be heard in certain cases—to ensure fairness.
No Oral Complaints: Allegations against public officials for their official acts must be in writing and backed by an affidavit.
Protection Against Harassment: The Court reaffirmed that these procedural safeguards are necessary to protect honest officers from being entangled in long-drawn legal battles for simply doing their jobs.

This judgment reinforces the principle that while the law must be accessible to the aggrieved, it must also provide a shield against the abuse of the legal process. By linking the requirements of Section 175(3) to Section 175(4), the Supreme Court has ensured that the BNSS functions as a cohesive system rather than a collection of disconnected rules.

For lawyers and litigants, the message is loud and clear: Before you knock on the Magistrate's door to complain about a public official, make sure you have your paperwork—specifically your written complaint to the SP and your supporting affidavit—in perfect order. Without them, the door will remain firmly shut.

Case Details: Criminal Appeal No. 4629 of 2025 Bench: Justices Dipankar Datta and Manmohan